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Response to Christopher Odinet, Super-
Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against 
Special Districts in Real Estate Finance 
Peter W. Salsich, Jr.*  
Professor Odinet’s excellent article, Super-Liens to the 
Rescue? A Case Against Special Districts in Real Estate Finance,1 
calls attention to the increasing use, and the attendant risks, of 
special taxing districts to finance infrastructure for private 
residential developments. He focuses on a specific type of special 
district, what he terms the “development special district,” in 
examining the pressures brought to bear on American local 
governments in the aftermath of the recent housing crisis and the 
Great Recession.2  
A complex, ten-page hypothetical, reminding one of the 
intricate fact patterns law students often confront on final exams, 
introduces Professor Odinet’s topic.3 A fictitious couple, Henry 
and Claire, purchased a home during the early stages of 
development of Beau Chateaux, a large, upscale, and gated 
community. Beau Chateaux offered a range of services and 
amenities paid for by the proceeds of bonds issued by a statutorily 
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 1.  Christopher K. Odinet, Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against 
Special Districts in Real Estate Finance, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2015). 
 2.  See id. at 723–25  
In the wake of these events, political tolerance for centralized 
decision-making—and spending—has declined significantly. In its 
place has been a rise of an intense focus on cities and local 
governments. But municipalities have, in many ways, a heavier yoke 
to carry in the wake of the financial downturn . . . . [L]ocal 
government decision-making has been steered precariously toward 
the creation of more and more special taxing districts as an 
instrument for economic, financial, and cultural viability, which has, 
in turn, served as an invitation for abuse and poor policymaking.  
 3.  Id. at 709–18. 
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authorized, city council-created governmental entity called a 
“development special district.” The development special district 
had been created at the request of Beau Chateaux’s developer. Its 
boundaries were co-terminus with Beau Chateaux. Its three-
person board, selected by the developer and appointed by the city 
council, had the authority to issue bonds backed by the power of 
the special district to impose special assessments and property 
taxes on homeowners in Beau Chateaux.   
 Henry and Claire purchased their home at the top of the 
recent housing boom and did not notice that many of the lots 
remained vacant. When the Great Recession hit in 2007–2008, 
people stopped buying homes and lots in Beau Chateaux. Neither 
could the developer honor its obligations, nor could the 
development taxing district, which had issued a large number of 
bonds to finance the development’s infrastructure and amenities. 
After the developer declared bankruptcy, Realty Bank, which had 
financed the developer’s land acquisition, filed foreclosure 
proceedings. The bondholders also began foreclosure proceedings, 
setting up a duel for priority status. Beau Chateaux’s troubles 
mirrored those of the real estate market nationally, leaving 
millions of borrowers facing foreclosure:  
As part of the special district legal structure, the nonpayment 
of special assessments charged against the parcels within the 
development—much like with traditional real property taxes—
created a lien on the individual lots. These in turn could be 
foreclosed upon like any other security device. And, also like 
real property taxes, this lien—although the product of an 
entirely private enterprise, used entirely for profit, and the 
financing of which was controlled by the developer—is 
accorded superpriority over and above any pre-existing 
security rights . . . [including Realty Bank’s first mortgage] 
and, when foreclosed, would wipe out and completely destroy 
the lien of the bank.4 
 Henry, Claire, and the other residents of Beau Chateaux 
realized they were in trouble when both the bondholders and the 
bank took them to court over the relative priority of the two sets 
of liens. The foreclosure proceedings became wake-up calls for the 
residents, as they began to understand that not only was title to 
                                                                                                     
 4.  Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted). 
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their homes in jeopardy, but also that the unfinished and 
neglected development infrastructure—streets, sidewalks, 
community park, community center, and golf course, as well as 
the large number of vacant houses and lots—was casting a pall 
over the value of their homes and those in adjoining 
neighborhoods. 
Professor Odinet argues that widespread use of special 
taxing districts by private residential real estate developers 
played a major role in the housing collapse and resulting 
foreclosure crisis during the Great Recession. In his view, private 
developer use of special taxing districts led to four adverse 
results: (1) developer overextension of the special taxing districts, 
(2) producing substantial ripple effects in surrounding 
communities, (3) resulting in excessive subordination of 
residential mortgage loans, and (4) causing traditional real estate 
lenders and the residential secondary mortgage market to curtail 
sharply residential lending, particularly in lower-income 
neighborhoods.5  
Development special districts are a variation of traditional 
special taxing districts commonly used to finance public 
infrastructure, such as water and sewer facilities or fire 
protection services for a relatively large area like a municipality 
or a county. He notes that special taxing districts have spread 
from one fire protection district in Rhode Island in 1797 to 
“roughly as many special districts as there are counties, 
townships and cities across the United States combined.”6 
Professor Odinet explains that, while development special 
districts usually are established by local governments, they 
typically are organized to serve private residential developments 
governed by homeowners associations and cover much smaller 
areas within sponsoring municipalities and counties. 
Development special districts give private, profit-motivated 
developers access to the tax-exempt municipal bond technique as 
a financing mechanism for infrastructure to serve self-contained 
residential developments, including upscale, gated communities. 
Because of the Federalism principle limiting the ability of one 
                                                                                                     
 5.  Id. at 718–21. 
 6.  Id. at 736. 
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level of government to tax the income of another level of 
government, interest income on municipal bonds and notes is not 
taxable. Thus, the cost of borrowing money to finance residential 
development may be 1%–2% less through development special 
districts than through private lending sources. Bonds and notes 
typically are retired through payments made by residents 
receiving the benefits of development special district financing, 
usually through special assessments on their residential 
property. 
Professor Odinet’s concern is the relative priority that should 
be granted these bonds and notes. He sharply criticizes state 
enabling legislation that grants development special district 
bonds and notes superpriority status over senior residential 
mortgage loans provided by banks to enable developers to acquire 
land in the first place. Superpriority status, in his view, can lead 
to several unintended consequences, including taking mortgage 
lenders’ property without just compensation, destabilizing the 
conventional mortgage market, causing the secondary mortgage 
market to shy away from purchasing residential mortgages 
within a development special district, and creating “a substantial 
negative effect on fundamental market fairness.”7  
Odinet believes development special districts “have the 
potential to serve a valid purpose” if they are limited to financing 
the “development of areas that would otherwise be cut off from 
the lending market.”8  But he worries that cities will find the lure 
of potential economic development bonanzas “too tempting.” 
Professor Odinet believes “cities have become ravenous for new 
forms of tax revenues,” primarily because of the substantial loss 
in local revenue cities have suffered since the Great Recession as 
a result of significant declines in property values, along with 
severe cuts in federal and state financial assistance to local 
governments.  
Odinet discusses reform possibilities, including a contractual 
mechanism requiring developers to obtain consent of first priority 
mortgage lenders before creating a development special district, 
and legislation restricting the use of development special districts 
                                                                                                     
 7.  Id. at 758–78. 
 8.  Id. at 740. 
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to projects which “could not occur without public support”9 and 
which would serve to “ameliorat[e] an economically depressed or 
underserved area.”10 The contract approach has a “major 
drawback,” in that local governments create development special 
districts and cannot be bound by private contract without their 
approval. He is wary of a legislative approach because he believes 
that state and local legislatures are unlikely to “truly evaluate 
each development special district request with a discerning 
eye.”11                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Professor Odinet settles on a recommendation that courts use 
the doctrine of equitable subordination “to police situations 
whereby special district liens were used in overreaching ways to 
the prejudice of the pre-existing rights of third parties . . . .”12 He 
proposes a “two-step process” in which courts, using market 
analyses, economic studies, and risk analyses, would first 
determine whether the developer could have received financing 
through “traditional channels and achieved the same result as he 
did using the special district.”13 If the answer was yes, 
development special district liens “should be subordinated to the 
rights of the pre-existing mortgagee.”14 If the answer is no, the 
court should then move to the second part of the test to determine 
whether the developer could show through “substantiated 
evidence” that the project would provide “tangible benefits to an 
economically distressed area.”15 “[D]oes the development bring 
jobs, blight improvement, or other economic benefits to an area 
that is in need of investment, resources, and opportunity?”16 If 
the answer to this question is yes, “the superpriority of the 
special district lien should be respected.”17 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 784. 
 10. Id.  
 11.  Id. at 780–84. 
 12.  Id. at 785. 
 13.  Id. at 786. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 787. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 786–87. 
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Describing his approach as a “balancing of interests,”  
Professor Odinet compares it to long-standing federal bankruptcy 
court practice and the state court doctrine of unconscionable 
contracts. He asserts that in both situations, courts play an 
important role in balancing interests of competing creditors, as 
well as debtors.18 
Professor Odinet’s approach merits careful consideration. 
Certainly the courts can, and should, police public debt 
transactions when interests of private parties are implicated. But 
has he overreacted in one direction to correct an overreaction in 
the other direction by cities and states before and during the 
Great Recession? He raises a basic policy question: to what extent 
should states authorize local governments to use public 
borrowing powers in the pursuit of private investment, and in the 
process provide superpriority status to special district liens that 
may prejudice the rights of prior mortgage lenders and other pre-
existing creditors? To answer that policy question, he turns to the 
courts and the doctrine of equitable subordination previously 
noted.19 But courts are not supposed to make policy; their role is 
to resolve disputes that may arise out of the application of a given 
policy. Courts play a vital role in guarding against excessive 
favoritism and misuse of taxing and spending powers. But judges, 
for the most part, are appointed, not elected. They do not 
represent the people affected by use, or abuse, of development 
special districts.  
We elect legislators to debate and resolve policy questions. 
We should not turn our backs on the legislative process because 
of excessive, and perhaps unwise, legislative decisions during a 
period of severe economic pressure and panic. Policy is 
established through the weighing and balancing that is the 
essence of the legislative process. The democratic ideals of 
inclusion and consideration of all relevant interests, and the 
necessary compromises by representatives of those interests, are 
fostered through the legislative process. It may be messy, but it is 
the essence of our democracy.  
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. at 788–90. 
 19.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining the adverse results 
of private developer use of special taxing districts). 
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 Professor Odinet’s proposed test can be applied to the 
legislative process. State enabling legislation can limit city 
council authority to create development special districts by 
requiring the council to make a legislative finding that projects 
supported by development special districts provide “tangible 
benefits to an economically distressed area.”20 The same burden 
can be placed on a developer to provide “substantiated evidence,” 
including “actual data and tangible evidence to support realistic 
projections as to the benefits that will accrue to the target area.”21     
The term “substantiated evidence” suggests evidence 
introduced by persons who testify under oath and are subject to 
cross-examination, a procedure which is not a formal part of the 
local legislative process. But the more informal nature of city 
council meetings certainly does not prohibit sharp questioning of 
witnesses and close examination of data presented by those 
witnesses. Most municipalities have access to professional 
analysis of development proposals, either from their own staff or 
by contract with private planning firms or higher level 
governmental organizations (county or state). Granted, the track 
record for local government scrutiny of development special 
district requests has not been stellar, as Professor Odinet notes.22 
But their past record does not mean that local government 
officials cannot be trusted to provide proper scrutiny of 
development proposals, particularly if proper guidance is given to 
those officials in state enabling legislation.  
As Professor Odinet chronicles, special districts arose in 
response to a variety of demands for infrastructure funding in 
situations where the general taxing power of cities and counties 
had been restricted, often reacting to some type of actual or 
perceived overspending.  Because special districts are created as 
separate and distinct units of local government, they receive their 
own taxing and spending authority and limitation.23 By 
authorizing the establishment of special districts, states enable 
the development and maintenance of public infrastructure, 
                                                                                                     
 20. Odinet, supra note 1, at 787. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 784. 
 23. See id. at 740 (explaining the independent nature of special districts). 
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without requiring that infrastructure to compete for funding with 
agencies and projects of general-purpose governmental entities 
within whose borders the infrastructure may be located.24 As a 
result, the total taxing and spending authority for public projects 
within the geographic boundaries of a city or county is increased, 
often by a considerable amount.  
Professor Odinet devotes a substantial portion of his article 
to a discussion of what he believes are the unintended 
consequences of extensive reliance on development special 
districts.25 His concerns that granting superpriority status to 
development special district bonds can undermine vested 
property rights, destabilize conventional real estate lending, and 
have “a substantial negative effect on fundamental market 
fairness”26 deserve serious attention. But these concerns can be 
dealt with in the legislative process.  
Elected officials can, and should, make taxing and spending 
decisions. These decisions are subject to traditional constitutional 
requirements that funds be used for public purposes.27 The courts 
should not be called upon to judge the effectiveness or wisdom of 
a particular project. That judgment is better left to the legislature 
for two reasons: (1) such decisions require a careful weighing and 
balancing of a number of factors, including the relative priority to 
be given a particular project and the likelihood that the project 
will produce the results sought; (2) voters expect the legislature, 
rather than the judiciary, to make the required judgments.   
In this context, the judiciary’s job is threefold: resolve 
disputes regarding (1) the constitutionality of a particular 
statute, (2) the legislature’s authority to enact the statute in 
question, and (3) the applicability of a statute to a particular 
                                                                                                     
 24. See id. at 735 (noting that “cities often compete with one another for the 
same projects” without special districts in place).  
 25.  Id. at 758–78. 
 26.  Id. at 773. 
 27.  For evidence that courts are not necessarily better protectors of the 
public purse, witness the judicial evolution of the Fifth Amendment’s “Takings” 
Clause requirement of a “public use” from Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
(upholding use of eminent domain and subsequent transfer of acquired property 
to private persons in order to eliminate slums and blight) to Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (noting that acquisition of property and transfer to 
private entities for economic development serves a proper public purpose). 
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situation. Whether the statute in question is good or bad policy 
should be left to the legislature.  
Professor Odinet apparently does not believe that local and 
state legislators are up to the task of making effective policy 
judgments regarding development proposals seeking public 
subsidies:  
When cities and municipalities are being pushed to drive 
economic growth and to spur new jobs and investment, there is 
little chance that local government decision makers—much 
less state legislators—will truly evaluate each development 
special district request with a discerning eye . . . . With so 
many economic and political pressures facing cities today in 
terms of their role in the economic recovery, it is of little doubt 
that every development special district request would meet 
whatever criteria or narrow purpose the lawmaker could 
craft.28 
He cites “pressures put on American cities post the Great 
Recession”29 and “the effects of the economic crisis on local 
governments.”30 These pressures were, and continue to be, 
extraordinary. In part, though, these pressures exist because of 
modern tax and expenditure limitations, such as Proposition 13 
in California.31 
State and local governments are not perfect by any measure. 
Elected officials at all levels of government are subject to intense 
pressures to favor one or another interest group. Development 
special districts are a product of the private developer interest 
group. They can, and do, serve useful purposes. But their access 
to superpriority status for their liens needs to be regulated, as 
Professor Odinet rightly argues.  
We disagree on the proper approach to this regulation. I 
believe it can be accomplished by modifying state enabling 
legislation as discussed above, rather than further hamstringing 
state and local legislators with a required judicial proceeding, 
which Professor Odinet advocates. Involving the courts in 
protracted analyses of the prospects for success of particular 
                                                                                                     
 28.  Odinet, supra note 1, at 784–85. 
 29.  Id. at 784 n. 427. 
 30.  Id. at 785 n. 428. 
 31.  CALIF. CONST., art. XIII A (1978, as amended in 1986 and 2000). 
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public-private infrastructure-based development proposals risks 
turning the courts into super-legislative bodies in which lawyers 
and judges replace voters and legislators. Perhaps I am naive, but 
I believe state and local legislative bodies are up to the task of 
regulating development special districts, if given proper 
instructions in the enabling legislation. 
  
 
 
